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Abstract: This paper offers a preliminary investigation into the conditions under which it might 
be optimal to engage in proactive management of a non-timber forest resource in the presence of 
an invasive species whose spread is unaffected by management action. Proactive management is 
defined as treating an uninfected area in order to encourage healthy ecosystem function, given 
that the arrival of the invasive is inevitable. Inspired by the problem of white pine blister rust in 
the Rocky Mountain west, the model was solved under varying assumptions concerning the scale 
of management action, benefit and costs, the discount rate, and uncertainty of spread. Results 
showed that proactive strategies tended to be optimal when, ceteris paribus, a) more resources 
are available for treatment; b) the costs of treatment are rapidly increasing in forest health, or 
conversely, the benefits of healthy and unhealthy stands are relatively similar; and c) the 
discount rate is low. The introduction of uncertainty did not significantly affect the likelihood of 
a proactive management strategy being optimal, but did show that the conditional probabilities of 
infection play important role in the decision of which uninfected stand should be treated if a 
choice is available to the manager. 
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of the “global economy”, highly identified with increased movement of goods 
and services, has also increased the probability of non-marketable organisms establishing 
themselves in areas outside of their native habitat (Mack et al. 2000, Mack and Lonsdale 2001). 
In some cases, economic damages associated with such movement and establishment will be 
minimal.
1 In others, however, conditions such as a lack of natural enemies for the non-native 
species and/or a lack of resistance in native organisms to the new species may be sufficient to 
render significant damages, and earn the label of invasive pest (Schoettle and Sniezko, 2007).  
Forests are among the ecosystems being impacted by non-native pests and pathogens. 
Numerous non-native arthropod pests and non-native plant species have already disrupted many 
forest ecosystems throughout North America. Examples include Cryphonectria parasitica 
(Murrill) Barr, the fungal pathogen responsible for chestnut blight of American chestnut trees; 
Ophiostoma novo-ulmi Brasier, the fungal pathogen responsible for the Dutch elm disease of 
American elm and other native elm species; and Cronartium ribicola J.C. Fisch., the fungal 
pathogen that causes white pine blister rust (WPBR) and cycles between native 5-needle white 
pines, currants, and gooseberries. The non-native pathogens have severely reduced some forest 
species populations, altered forest composition, and threatened the habitats of endangered 
animals (Liebold et al. 1995).  
  Most invasive species management strategies focus on (1) prevention, (2) early detection 
and eradication, (3) containment and control, and when those efforts are unsuccessful, (4) 
mitigation of impacts and (5) restoration of the degraded forest (Schoettle and Sniezko, 2007). 
However, in some cases (such as with WPBR), (1)-(3) have proven challenging, with no 
                                                 
1 Of course, such damages can be to marketable and/or non-marketable ecosystem services. 
  2effective strategies identified. As such, there is a growing interest in preemptively managing 
ecosystems to mitigate the potential negative impacts of invasives before significant damage 
occurs. However, only recently have the physical outcomes of these forest management 
techniques been explored, and the economic conditions under which such “proactive 
management” is optimal have not been analyzed (Schoettle and Sniezko, 2007).  
This paper provides a preliminary model that can be used to analyze the conditions under 
which it might be optimal to pursue a proactive, as opposed to reactive, management strategy in 
the case of an invasive forest pathogen whose spread cannot be contained. A spatially-explicit 
stochastic dynamic programming model is developed that tracks the state of each of N number of 
stands of a host tree species potentially infected by a damaging invasive species. Subject to the 
expected evolution of the forest, a manager is assumed to allocate (finite) resources to treat the 
forest, and can treat any stand in either a proactive (prior to arrival of the invasive) or reactive 
(after invasive establishment) manner. Results highlight the circumstances under which proactive 
management is favored, including the physical structure of the forest, stand/forest benefits, 
management costs, and the probabilities of pathogen spread. 
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, there are 
no published articles in the economics or forestry literature that utilize a dynamic programming 
methodology to evaluate forest management strategies in the presence of an invasive species. 
There are, however, a few examples of using these techniques for timber management, including 
Spring and Kennedy (2005), who examined optimal harvest on multiple stands in the presence of 
stochastic fire risk and an endangered species in Australia, and Moore and Conroy (2006), who 
examined silviculture practices for management of old growth forests for habitat purposes in a 
wildlife refuge in Georgia. Second, there is little in the economics literature regarding proactive 
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that would advocate preservation of native genotypes. However, proactive management may 
enable naturalization of the non-native organism while sustaining host populations and 
ecosystem function (Kilpatrick 2006). Finally, this study contributes to the literature on spatial 
process in the environmental and resource literature through the incorporation of an explicit 
spatial structure in the representation of the forest through which an invasive organism moves. In 
the presence of budget constraints, decisions regarding which stands to manage (either 
proactively or reactively) will inevitably involve tradeoffs over space as well as time. 
2. Rationale of Proactive Management: The Case of White Pine Blister Rust (WPBR) 
Cronartium ribicola, the fungus that causes WPBR, is among the invasive species introductions 
into North America where containment and eradication efforts have failed (Maloy 1997). It was 
introduced on the northeast cost of North America from Europe in the early twentieth century, 
and has since caused a variety of damage to the keystone species of noncommercial five-needle 
pines in high elevation North American ecosystems, including foxtail, limber, Rocky Mountain 
bristlecone, southwestern white, and whitebark pines. WPBR is a lethal disease that causes tree 
mortality at all life stages, disrupting the regeneration cycle with potentially severe effects on 
white pine forests.
2  
Damages as a result of WPBR infection and tree mortality include effects on various 
ecosystem components and services such as animal populations (such as Clark’s nutcracker 
birds, grizzly bears, and red squirrels), watershed production through snow capture, biodiversity 
and degradation of high-quality recreation opportunities (Petit, 2007; Samman et al. 2003; 
(Tomback and Kendell 2001; Tomback et al. 1995; Mattson 1992; McKinney 2004; Kendell and 
Arno 1990; McDonald and Hoff 2001). In fact, forests of these types are among the most visited 
                                                 
2 Some infected areas in the American west have seen mortality of up to 90%. 
  4in the country, including those found in the Western region of the National Park system (e.g., 
Glacier, Yellowstone, and Rocky Mountain National Parks). 
The nature of five-needle pine forests suggests that natural evolution of resistance to 
WBPR is unlikely without intervention
3, though some natural genetic resistance has been 
identified in some stands. As such, breeding programs may help to preserve naturally resistant 
seed stock in high-elevation species, as is being done for commercial species of white pines 
(McDonald et al. 2004). The potential may soon exist for proactive management in which 
genetically-resistant trees are either directly planted or indirectly encouraged through alternative 
management actions (stimulating natural regeneration of resistant trees) prior to infection 
(Schoettle 2004a, 2004b, Schoettle and Sniezko, 2007). The rationale behind proactive 
management, then, is essentially preventative. Acting prior to invasion would presumably limit 
mortality and impact on various ecosystem services, increase the probability of a healthy, 
regenerative system in the long run, and reduce or eliminate the need for reactive management 
post-invasion. Of course, such management might also be not only directly costly (through 
management expenditures), but also generate costs (to, say, recreationalists or naturalists) from 
the disturbance of a previously undisturbed forest. We term such costs “management 
externalities”. 
To date, there has been little information provided to potential forest managers regarding 
the circumstances under which proactive management might be preferred to the more common 
reactive strategies (Burns et al. 2008). In the following sections, we provide a preliminary model 
that helps to shed light on these issues. Future research will refine the model using data on non-
                                                 
3 Individuals within these species can live for 1,000-4,500 years, can thrive in harsh environments, and are not 
frequently disturbed through stochastic events such as fire (Schoettle 1994; Schoettle and Rochelle 2000; Schauer et 
al. 2001; Schulman 1958; Curry 1965; Brustein and Yamaguchi 1992). 
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region. 
3. Model 
3.1 General Description of the Dynamic Management Model 
 
We assume that a resource manager has responsibility over a forest threatened by a non-native 
species whose spread cannot be arrested through any management action (a circumstance such as 
WPBR). As in Spring and Kennedy (2005), the forest is composed of N stands, with the state of 
each stand in time period t represented by one of a countable number of states representing a) the 
health of the stand (or level of ecosystem services provided by the stand) and b) the status of the 
stand as “treated” or “untreated”. An untreated stand, once infected by the invasive pest and left 
untreated, will dynamically evolve such that mortality increases (ecosystem services decrease) 
until a terminal level is reached and maintained throughout the infinite time horizon of the 
problem. Once treated, a stand recovers until it reaches a relatively healthy terminal state, where 
it remains for the remainder of the problem.  
The manager may treat any stand at any time, but is subject to a budget constraint that 
limits the number of stands treated in any one decision period. For simplicity, we assume only 
one treatment alternative whose success is certain (though this is fairly easily relaxed), and per-
stand treatment costs are assumed to decrease with tree mortality (increase with ecosystem 
service provision). As noted above, spread of the invasive species is assumed not to depend on 
management actions, and is directional and potentially probabilistic in its spread. Ecosystem 
service benefits from the physical state of each stand are assumed to be homogeneous and 
decreasing in stand mortality, and total net benefits from the forest are additive across stands. 
The manager is assumed to maximize the net present value of the expected net benefits from 
  6stand treatment over an infinite time horizon, subject to the spread and damage caused by the 
invasive species and the budget constraint.  
3.2 Forest Dynamics 
The model of the forest is cellular and spatial in nature, with N=4 stands. At any time t, each 
stand  i x , i=1,…,N, is assumed to be in one of  S=7 discrete states representing the overall health 
of the stand and the treatment status of it. Overall, there are three health states corresponding to 
ecosystem service provision (healthy, moderately healthy, and not healthy) and two treatment 
states (treated and untreated) for stands that have been infected by the invasive, plus one more 
state representing a healthy stand that has not yet been exposed to the non-native pathogen. The 
total number of potential states of the forest is thus  which illustrates the 





The states of each stand are defined categorically, where  0 i x = implies lack of invasive 
establishment on an untreated stand. Let  i τ  be an indicator variable that signifies if stand i has 
ever been treated, and restrict attention to stands where the invasive has been established. As 
such, untreated stands can take on states 
    (1) 
1 if  0 and stand   is healthy
2 if  0 and stand   is moderately healthy.













Once treatment has occurred, the three potential states are  
    (2) 
4 if  1 and stand   is healthy
5 if  1 and stand   is moderately healthy.













                                                 
4 For larger state spaces, more advanced techniques (rollout strategies, temporal difference learning, etc…) can be 
used to approximate the optimal solution. See, e.g., Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996). 
  7State transitions in time t+1 depend on the initial state of the stand at time t (namely  it x ), 
the value of the treatment control variable for that stand ( 1 if treated it u = ), and in the case of an 
uninfected stand, the event of stand infection and establishment, denoted by the event 
indicator 1 i φ = . The state transitions are thus defined as 
 
1
0 if  0 and  0 and  0
1 if  0 and  1 and  0
4 if  0 and  1 and  1
+1 if 0< 3 and  0
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Note that state 3 (unhealthy stand) is a terminal state for untreated regions, while state 4 (healthy 
stand) is a terminal state for treated regions. Assuming that the effects of treatment are certain 
and there are no other exogenous threats to the forest (e.g., fire, climate change, etc…), the only 
stochastic element in the model is the infection and establishment event  1. it φ =  We turn to 
considerations of this variable in the next subsection. 
3.3 Probabilities of Stand Infection and Spatial Forest Structure 
The spatial configuration of the forest is represented by a  matrix  with elements 
 For row i, a non-zero element in position j indicates that an infected neighbor j 
increases the probability of infection of stand i in the following period. Similarly, for column j, a 
non-zero element in row i indicates that stand i is more at risk once j is infected. As such, 
through specification of this matrix, a “directionality” of spread can be modeled. For example, 
suppose that spread is deterministic in a southeast direction (including due east and due south), in 
x NN , z
(0,1). ij z =
  8the sense that once a neighbor to the north or west of stand i is infected in time t, then stand i will 
become infected in time t+1 with a probability of one, and otherwise will not be infected. Further 
assume that are stands arranged in a rectangular formulation such that stand 1 is to the northwest, 
stand 2 is northeast, stand 3 is in the southwest, and stand 4 is in the southeast. The matrix z is 













z  (4) 
so that, for example, stand 4 will be infected in t+1 if any of stands 1, 2, or 3 are infected in time 
t (row 4), but the infection status of stand 2 only affects the probabilities associated with stand 4 
(2
nd column). 
In general, we assume that the probabilities associated with establishment of the invasive 
on a given stand are a function of the number of infected neighboring stands as defined by the 
matrix   Let if  0 otherwise, and define the number of infected neighboring stands 
for stand i as 
. z 1 ij s =  0, j x >
, ii j
j
nz s =⋅ ∑ i j with  0 i n 3 . ≤ ≤  The infection and establishment event, then, is a 
function of the spatial structure of the forest and the states of the surrounding stand, and the 
associated probabilities, namely  ( ) Pr | ( , ) , ii n φ xz are given in Table 1. 
Using these, define  ( Pr | , ( , ), ij i i i) x xn u
+ xz to be the probability of a stand transitioning 
from state  i x  to state  ij x
+  conditional on the state of the forest and the control chosen. Of the   
potential states in the model, then, the transitions associated with   are deterministic. In 
the case presented here, this is approximately 54% of all possible starting states in the stochastic 




  93.4 Economic Parameters 
Table 2 reports information about the benefits and costs associated with forest management. We 
assume that in each (multi-year) period, benefits from the forest are the sum of stand-level 
ecosystem service benefits, which are increasing with the health of each stand. We denote these 
as ( ). i f x Treatment costs   are incurred only in the current period, and are decreasing 
with the health of each stand due to ease of management and the potential for management 
externalities. 
( , ) ii cu x
  The manager is assumed to be constrained in action due to budget, and as such can only 
treat a limited number of stands per period.
5 As such, the control set U is defined directly from 
this constraint. For example, if the budget is one stand per year, then the number of elements in 
U is five, corresponding to treating each individual stand plus not treating any. If, however, two 
stands may be treated in the same time period, then the control set is augmented to include 
eleven possible stand combinations. 
  Collecting these assumptions and placing them in the framework of a dynamic 
programming problem, the discrete-time Bellman equation characterizing the problem is 
 
() { [] ( ) }
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x| x , n ( x , z ) , u x xφ u
  (5) 
where   is the vector of state transition equations defined in (3),  (,,)
+ xxφ u
( Pr j
+ x| x , n ( x , z ) , u )  is the probability of transition from state   to  x j
+ x , defined as the product 
of the stand level probabilities  ( ) Pr | , ( , ), ij i i i x xn u
+ xz , and β is the discount factor, suitably 
defined to reflect the number of years assumed between each time period. 
                                                 
5 Given this assumption, the interpretation of the budget constraint should not be strictly monetary. Rather, one 
might interpret it as a binding constraint on additional resources, such as labor or capital. 
  10The model was coded and solved numerically in MATLAB using the default policy 
iteration method of the CompEcon toolbox in Miranda and Fackler (2002). 
4. Results 
4.1 Optimal Deterministic Policies 
Optimal policies for a sample of starting states under two budget constraints (a maximum of one 
stand treated per decision period and a maximum of two stands treated per decision period) are 
presented in Table 3, assuming deterministic invasive species spread in the southeast direction 
with stands one and two to the north and stands three and four to the south arranged in a 
rectangular fashion (see Figure 1). The discount factor is assumed to be 0.9. 
Under the baseline parameterization and considering the case of a maximum of one 
treated stand per period, there are 1,105 forest configurations in which proactive management, 
defined relatively strictly as treating an uninfected, previously untreated stand, is feasible.
6 Of 
this set, approximately 13% (145) of the optimal management strategies could be classified as  
proactive. The large majority of these occur when the infection threat is immediate (i.e., a stand 
to the northwest of an uninfected stand is infected), and the other infected stands are either 
uninfected, or have already been treated, and thus are in states 4-6. Intuitively, this makes sense 
as the opportunity costs of treating a stand proactively in this case are small, given that the 
remainder of the forest is relatively protected and increasing in health.  
If, however, at least one stand is actively degrading or degraded (states 1-3), it is 
generally optimal to treat one of these stands in a reactive fashion (though the specifics depend 
on the relative states of each degrading stand and the potential for damage through spread).  One 
exception to this prescription is if exactly one of the stands is only moderately healthy (state = 2) 
                                                 
6 Given the state transition structure assumed here, it might be logical to term treatment of infected, healthy stands 
(state 1) as proactive. We choose not to in order to shed light on primarily “preventative” management options, 
rather than “quick response” actions implied by treatment of infected, healthy stands.  
  11and the only other infected stand has been treated. In this case, the optimal strategy is to 
proactively treat the northeast-most uninfected stand. Presumably, this result occurs as a result of 
the interaction between the opportunity costs of treatment and the fact that treatment costs for the 
moderately infected stand will fall enough such that it pays to wait to treat. We further explain 
the incentives in section 4.2 below. 
If the budget constraint is relaxed to accommodate treatment of up to two stands per time 
period, then the percentage of times it is optimal to pursue proactive strategies increases to 41%, 
more than three times the one-stand per time period number. This set of proactive strategies 
generally includes cases where if there are two or more stands infected, at least one has already 
been treated. Given the flexibility inherent in this parameterization of the problem, the spatial 
dimension is more apparent as well. For example, a manager will generally treat degrading cells 
to the northwest, ceteris paribus, through s/he still must trade off the potential for spread and 
increased future damage with the cost decrease (and own-stand damage increase) if treatment 
does not occur.  
As such, we conclude that proactive management under this deterministic directional 
spread scenario is generally favored as resource constraints are relaxed, but not at the expense of 
reactive management when multiple stands are degrading. However, this is but one set of benefit 
and cost schedules, suggesting an analysis of the effects of these measures at the margin is 
appropriate.  
4.2 The Effects of Benefits and Costs 
Of course, the tradeoffs involved in dynamic forest management in the presence of an invasive 
species are in large part determined by the marginal benefits and costs of treatment, which in 
turn depend on both spatial and temporal features. We now turn to the effects of shifting the 
  12relative benefit and cost schedules associated with forest stands in order to determine their 
effects. 
   To illustrate, we run an experiment which doubles the cost of treatment in healthy stands 
and cuts the cost of treatment in unhealthy stands by half, while keeping costs for the moderately 
healthy stands the same in the two-stand constrained deterministic spread model. Thus, we have 
increased the marginal costs of treating a healthy forest, perhaps mirroring a case of relatively 
severe management externalities.  
  Following our earlier analysis, proactive strategies are now optimal for almost 57% 
(626/1105) of possible cases, despite the increase in treatment costs for uninfected and healthy 
stands. Part of the reason can be seen in from the difference in strategies when 
 and  [] 1000 a ′ = x [ 1100. b ] ′ = x  When the cost of treatment for healthy stands is 
relatively low,  [ ]  1&2
low
a ut r e a t = , but when it is relatively high,   [ ]  2&3.
high
a ut r e a t =  Similarly, 
for  ,  b x [ ]  1&2
low
a ut r e a t =  and  [ ] 3&4 .
high
a ut r e a t =  Note that in case a, both scenarios involve 
proactive management, while in case b, only   treats (both) uninfected stands.  
high
a u
This result cannot simply be explained by a change in the relative costs across cells, as 
treatment costs are homogeneous across all four stands. As such, the answer must lie with the 
opportunity costs of treatment. Advancing the system in case a) according to the optimal policy, 
 and  [] 5411
low
a
+ ′ = x [ 2441 ,
high
a
+ ] ′ = x  with corresponding policies at these new states 
defined by  [ ]  3&4
low
a ut r e a t
+ =  and  [ ] 1&4 .
high
a ut r e a t
+ =  Following the paths to their terminal 
states of   as in Table 4, it is clear that the low takes three decision periods to 
reach  , while the high case takes four. The reason is that in the high case, the marginal benefit 
[ 4444 ,
∞ ′ = x ]
∞ x
  13from the treatment cost reduction outweighs the (discounted) marginal reduction in benefits from 
allowing stand 1 to devolve into an unhealthy state, and then recovering once treated. Thus, the 
manager prefers what we might call a “purely” proactive strategy in period one, but does so, 
perhaps counter intuitively, in order to capture the “benefits” of stand degradation. 
Turning to case b, we see a very similar result, as the manager prefers to engage in a 
proactive strategy to protect stands 3 and 4 in the first period, while allowing for stands 1 and 2 
to degrade in order to take advantage of the relative cost savings offered by treating partially 
healthy forests. These savings dominate the decision despite the additional expense of loosing 
benefits in period two (after the second control decision), relative to the low case, as a result of 
two unhealthy treated stands that take an extra period to return to health. 
We have thus illustrated that proactive strategies tend to be favored when the costs of 
stand treatment are increasing relatively rapidly in stand health, and conversely, then, when the 
benefits of stand health are relatively unresponsive to degradation. Given the role that future 
damages play in the analysis, however, we now turn to the effect of the discount rate on the 
solution to the problem. 
4.3 The Effect of the Discount Rate 
The baseline analysis assumed a discount factor of  0.9 β =  as weights between the (unspecified) 
time period between which decisions regarding treatment are made and the forest stands evolve. 
Without greater biological detail, it is hard to determine if such a weighting is appropriate for all 
scenarios. On the one hand, the length of time it takes species such as five-needle pines to grow 
and evolve might suggest that the discount factor should be lower; on the other hand, 
intergenerational equity and other concerns provide an argument that the discount factor should 
be relatively close to one (Spring and Kennedy, 2005; Weitzman 2001).  
  14  In order to investigate the effects of the discount rate, additional scenarios were analyzed 
as the discount factor decreased (less weight on the future). One would suspect that as the 
present was favored, the incentives for proactive management would decrease as the marginal 
benefits of treating an individual stand would decrease. In fact, this is exactly the case, and in 
some cases, is quite dramatic. For example, if the discount factor is 0.5 under the two-stand 
constraint, then the optimal strategy is to treat only completely degraded stands once that state is 
reached, and do nothing to any other stand in any other state. As such, the percentage of potential 
proactive management occasions that are optimal is zero. At  0.65, β = this percentage increases 
to a very small one half of one percent (all cases where stand 1, which is positioned to spread the 
invasive to all other stands, is infected), and when  0.70 β =  and higher, the result is identical to 
the baseline scenario. 
  As such, so long as the discount rate (factor) is sufficiently low (high), proactive 
management strategies are part of the optimal forest management plan. In the cases considered 
here, there is a fairly narrow range with .60 .70 β < <  over which the optimal policies are 
affected, and tend to favor proactive strategies only when the spread potential for the invasive 
species is high and the forest is generally healthy. This corresponds to a situation in which a low 
weight placed on future outcomes is outweighed by the damage caused from increased invasive 
spread. 
4.4 The Effects of Uncertainty 
In addition to the deterministic scenarios analyzed above, the model was also solved taking into 
account a probabilistic establishment regime for the invasive (see Table 1), but maintaining all 
other baseline scenario parameters for the two-stand constrained problem. In general, this 
scenario assumes that the threat of the invasive to an uninfected stand is increasing in the number 
  15of infected stands that have the ability to threaten it (in the sense of the matrix z). In addition, 
there is an external threat in that the forest in the state [0 0 0 0] can become infected (in this case, 
with a probability of .4). For simplicity, the manager is assumed to maximize the expected net 
present value of profits, and thus is risk neutral in preferences. 
  Results of this exercise reveal that only small changes in optimal policy rules occur as a 
result of the uncertainty over spread.
7 In each case, it involves two infected stands with one 
treated, but the other two are undisturbed and must include stand 4. As direct result of the 
differential in probabilities of potential spread between the two stands, it is always optimal in the 
stochastic case to treat the “more threatened” stand 4, primarily as a direct result of the 
differential in probabilities of potential spread between the two stands. In the deterministic case, 
given the z matrix, the manager is indifferent between which stands to treat, as the probabilities 
related to spread are identical. As a result, there is no effect in the frequency of optimal proactive 
management over the deterministic case; rather, this result serves to guide the choice of stands to 
proactively manage, if there is indeed such a choice. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper offers a preliminary investigation into the conditions under which it might be optimal 
to engage in proactive management of a non-timber forest resource in the presence of an invasive 
species whose spread is unaffected by management action. Although contrary to current practice, 
proactive management is defined as treating an uninfected area in order to encourage healthy 
ecosystem function, given that the arrival of the invasive is inevitable. The model is inspired by 
the problem of white pine blister rust (WPBR) in the Rocky Mountain west of the United States, 
                                                 
7 Of course, we expect no difference in policy rules where proactive management is not possible, as these transitions 
are deterministic by assumption. 
  16which has severely impacted Glacier National Park, and is currently threatening Yellowstone and 
Rocky Mountain National Park, among other public lands. 
  The model was solved under varying assumptions concerning the potential scale of 
management action (through the budget constraint), the benefit and cost schedules associated 
with the forest resource, the discount rate, and the level of uncertainty of spread. Results showed 
that proactive management strategies tended to be optimal when, ceteris paribus, a) more 
resources are available for treatment (i.e., a greater number of stands can be treated in any one 
decision period); b) the costs of treatment are rapidly increasing in forest health, or conversely, 
the benefits of healthy and unhealthy stands are relatively similar; and c) the discount factor 
(rate) is high (low), implying a relatively high weight on the future. Additionally, although the 
introduction of uncertainty did not significantly affect the likelihood of a proactive management 
strategy being optimal, it did show that the conditional probabilities of infection play important 
role in the decision of which uninfected stand should be treated if a choice is available to the 
manager. 
  Although relatively simple, the model presented here should help managers understand 
the incentives related to non-timber forest management in the presence of an unavoidable and 
unalterable threat from an invasive species. That said, future research can do much to clarify and 
augment the conclusions reported here. For example, improved parameterizations for a given 
circumstance, including the economic and biological/epidemiological representations of the 
system based on collected data, could assuage concerns about arbitrary assumptions. This 
includes not only state-space representation of the forest, but the number of potential 
management units as well. Similarly, managers have multiple treatment strategies available 
(planting, burning, both, etc…), with outcomes of any strategy likely uncertain, with potentially 
  17varying streams of benefits and costs over time. As the modeling effort becomes more complex 
and thus more reflective of the system it represents, the results presented here can be used to 
verify and validate future results, as well as help inform about other similar processes and 
problems, such as the spread of infectious disease. 
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  21Table 1: Stand infection probabilities as a function of number of infected neighbors, 
deterministic and stochastic cases 
 
# of infected neighboring    
  
() Pr | (x,z) ii n φ   
  
stands ( i n )     Deterministic   Stochastic
0   0.0  0.1 
1   1.0  0.6 
2   1.0  0.8 
3     1.0    0.9 
 
 
Table 2: Net present value of benefits and costs for forest stand states per time period, 
baseline scenario 
 
State of stand 
i x      Description  
Per-stand benefits
() i fx   
Per-stand 
treatment costs 
(,) ii cu x  
Uninfected and not established       
0   Uninfected,  healthy    10    7 
Infected and established       
1    Infected and  healthy    10    7 
2    Infected and moderately healthy    5    5 
3    Infected and not healthy    0    2 
4    Treated and healthy    10    7 
5    Treated and moderately healthy    5    5 
6     Treated and not healthy    0    2 
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Table 3: Optimal policies for selected starting states and budget constraints, deterministic 
model 
 
               Optimal Treated Stands and Proactive Indicator 
Starting States    max 1 treated  max 2 treated 
Stand 1  Stand 2  Stand 3  Stand 4    Treated Stand Proactive?    Treated  Stands Proactive? 
0  0 0 0    none  no  none  no 
1  0 0 0    1  no  1,2  yes 
1  1 0 0    1  no  1,2  no 
1  4 0 0    1  no  1,3  yes 
2  0 0 0    2  yes  1,2  yes 
2  4 4 1    3  n/a  3,4  n/a 
5  4 4 1    4  n/a  4  n/a 
6  4 4 5    none  n/a  none  n/a 
4  4 4 4      none  n/a   none  n/a 
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Table 4: Sample simulations under alterative treatment cost assumptions, deterministic, two-stand constraint model 
 
 
   Case a 
  Low Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario Using Low-Cost Policy 
Time                Forest Treated  Benefits - NPV Forest Treated Benefits  - NPV Forest        Treated Benefits -  
Period                            State Stands Costs   State Stands Costs     State Stands Costs NPV
0 [1 0 0 0]  1,2 26 26.00 [1 0 0 0] 2,3 12 12.00 [1 0 0 0] 1,2 12 12.00
1 [5 4 1 1]  3,4 21 18.90 [2 4 4 1] 1,4 16 14.40 [5 4 1 1] 3,4 7 6.30
2 [4 4 5 5]  n/a 30 24.30 [6 4 4 5] n/a 25 20.25 [4 4 5 5] n/a 30 24.30
3 [4 4 4 4]  n/a 40 29.16 [5 4 4 4] n/a 35 25.52 [4 4 4 4] n/a 40 29.16
4 [4 4 4 4]  n/a 40 26.24 [4 4 4 4] n/a 40 26.24 [4 4 4 4] n/a 40 26.24
   Total 124.60 Total 98.41 Total 98.00
  Case b 
  Low Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario Using Low-Cost Policy 
0 [1 1 0 0]  1,2 26 26.00 [1 1 0 0] 3,4 12 12.00 [1 1 0 0] 1,2 12 12.00
1 [5 5 1 1]  3,4 16 14.40 [2 2 4 4] 1,2 20 18.00 [5 5 1 1] 3,4 2 1.80
2 [4 4 5 5]  n/a 30 24.30 [6 6 4 4] n/a 20 16.20 [4 4 5 5] n/a 30 24.30
3 [4 4 4 4]  n/a 40 29.16 [5 5 4 4] n/a 30 21.87 [4 4 4 4] n/a 40 29.16
4 [4 4 4 4]  n/a 40 26.24 [4 4 4 4]
 
n/a 40 26.24 [4 4 4 4]
 
n/a 40 26.24
                  Total 120.10 Total 94.31 Total 93.50
Low cost scenario: Treatment costs = $7 for healthy, $5 for moderately healthy, $2 for unhealthy         
High cost scenario: Treatment costs = $14 for healthy, $5 for moderately healthy, $1 for unhealthy         
Discount factor = 0.90                     
 Figure 1: Spatial configuration and predominant direction of spread (arrows) of a sample 
forest 
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